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Abstract:
The institution of slavery is found mostly at intermediate stages of agri-
cultural development, and less often among hunter-gatherers and advanced
agrarian societies. We explain this pattern in a growth model with land and
labor as inputs in production, and an endogenously determined property
rights institution. The economy endogenously transits from an egalitarian
state with equal property rights, to a despotic slave society where the elite
own both people and land; thereafter it endogenously transits into a free
labor society, where the elite own the land, but people are free.
2
1 Introduction
One of the most significant institutional transformations of human societies
involves property rights in man: slavery. It was not commonly practiced
among hunter-gatherers, or in the most advanced agrarian societies. Rather,
it has shown up mostly in societies at intermediate stages of pre-industrial
development. We explain this pattern by linking slavery to property rights
in another important production factor: land.
The basic idea is that the institution of most historical societies can
be characterized by the property rights of the elite to land and to people.
We argue that a distinct long-term property-rights pattern can be discerned
throughout human history. All human societies started oﬀ in an egalitarian
state with relatively equal division of resources. Over time they transformed
first into a state of despotism and slavery, with the elite owning both peo-
ple and land. Later a transition into a free labor society took place, where
the elite owned the land, but people were free. We seek to set up a model
replicating this three-stage process. More precisely: we want to model these
transitions endogenously, and using a setting where the factors driving them,
growth in population and technology, are endogenous as well.
The starting point is that slaves require guards (or a military), because
slavery amounts to capturing, conquering, and/or suppressing people, and
forcing them to work.1 In our model slavery arises when food procurement
technologies are productive enough to generate a surplus of output per agent
above subsistence, because this enables the use of people for other tasks than
1Slaves have often been the fruit of war, but also when they are traded on a market they
require some extra surveillance compared to free workers. For example, in the American
South whites were drafted for slave patrols to chase runaway slaves (Hadden 2001).
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immediate food production.2 In that sense, slavery in our model need not
be interpreted too literally; we can think of slaves as tax payers, and guards
as tax collectors. The point is that the slave’s consumption is held to the
subsistence level and the “surplus” is extracted by someone else. For the rest
of this paper we shall use the term slavery to describe this type of institution.
Our model has two production factors, land and labor, and there are
three types of institution. Under slavery the elite own both the land and
the subjects’ labor. As described, this carries a cost of feeding unproductive
guards to watch over the enslaved population. Another institution is that of
free labor, where the elite own the land, but the subjects supply their labor
on a free market, being paid their marginal product. The third institution
is an egalitarian society where the elite and the subjects divide land (or out-
put) equally. The elites across several societies collectively choose institution
according to what maximizes their payoﬀs.3
Which institution generates a higher payoﬀ to the elites depends on two
state variables: the productivity (or total size) of land, and population size.
Slavery dominates when land productivity is high enough, and population
density is at intermediate levels: not too high, not too low. For densely
populated societies, where free workers are relatively cheap, free labor pays
better than slavery. In sparsely populated societies, keeping scarce workers as
2Such a surplus would typically arrive with the invention of agriculture. However,
slavery also played an important role in many non-agricultural societies with abundant
food supply, e.g. aboriginal tribes on the Northwest Coast of North America (Donald
1997). This suggests that the existence of a surplus (rather than the use of agriculture in
itself) is what gives rise to slavery.
3As discussed in Section 2.6 and in Lagerlo¨f (2006), the outcome is similar under an
equilibrium approach, where each society’s elite choose institution independently, taking
as given what institutions other elites choose.
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unproductive guards is very costly, and an egalitarian structure dominates.
Our model thus suggests that population growth has played diﬀerent roles in
history. It was initially a factor transforming egalitarian societies into slave
societies, and later a factor driving the transition from slavery to free labor.
This brings us to the dynamic component of our model: the joint evo-
lution of agricultural technology and population. First, consistent with the
type of pre-industrial societies we are describing, we let children be a normal
good. This gives the model the Malthusian feature that higher per-capita
incomes induce higher fertility, and faster population growth. Second, we
also allow for a “Boserupian” eﬀect: population pressure spurs agricultural
technological progress (cf. Boserup 1965).
The result is a feedback loop in which the economy moves from a state
of low population density and simple agricultural technology toward increas-
ingly dense population and more advanced usage of land. In this process
the institution changes endogenously from egalitarianism, to slavery, to free
labor.
Our model is also consistent with other historical observations. Under
slavery reproductive success (fertility) is more unequally distributed across
agents than under egalitarianism and free labor. This is consistent with
slave societies being more polygynous than both hunter-gatherer societies,
and the type of free labor societies we live in today (Betzig 1986, Lagerlo¨f
2005, Wright 1994).
Another result in our model is that if an initially densely populated group
of societies colonizes a sparsely populated land mass, it may switch from free
labor to slavery, as happened when Europeans discovered the Americas.
However, the theory described so far has one shortcoming: if the economy
were to experience a slowdown in population growth and/or an acceleration
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in technological progress (an industrial revolution and a demographic tran-
sition), it would re-enter (or never leave) the slavery regime. This is avoided
in an extended setting, where guarding costs begin to rise with the level of
technology when technology reaches a certain threshold, interpreted as the
production mode becoming industrial, or multi-task. This is in line with
Fenoaltea (1984), who argues that multi-task production modes are less suit-
able for slavery.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. This section continues with
an overview of previous literature (Section 1.1), and presents the facts that
motivate the whole exercise (Section 1.2). Section 2 sets up the model, and
describes how the institution is determined. In Section 3 the dynamics of
population and agricultural technology are derived, showing how these state
variables evolve over time and generate transitions from one type of institu-
tion to another. Section 4 provides some further discussion, by extending the
model to allow guarding costs to increase with technology (Section 4.1), and
linking some features of the model to further empirical observations (Section
4.2). Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Previous literature
Existing theories of very long-run social evolution are often crafted outside
the discipline of economics. These do not make use of explicit models, and
typically do not focus on slavery as such (e.g., Flannery 1972, Diamond
1997). One theory specifically about slavery is that of Domar (1970). In his
reasoning population density was a force behind the downfall of slavery, as
it is in our model. Diﬀerent from us, however, Domar treats population as
exogenous. In reality, as in our model, rising population density seems to be
due to improved technologies in food production, and technological change
6
may in and by itself impact the viability of a slave institution, as suggested
by Fenoaltea (1984). Abstracting from this Domar is not able to explain the
rise of slavery, or why sparsely populated hunter-gather societies so rarely use
slavery (cf. the critique in Patterson 1977). However, all this is accounted
for in our model.
Aside from the general theories of Domar (1970) and Fenoaltea (1984),
many economic historians have studied plantation slavery in the U.S. South,4
and the rest of the Americas.5 Our aim is to model the rise and fall of slavery
as an institution in a broader world-historic context, and over time spans
stretching back before the invention of agriculture.
There is also work on the microeconomics of slavery. Bergstrom (1971)
and Findlay (1975) analyze, inter alia, slaves’ incentives to work when they
can buy their freedom. Genicot (2002) analyzes bound labor as an ex-ante
voluntary choice. These papers take the slave system as given, and do not
attempt any macroeconomic explanation of its rise or fall. Conning (2004)
uses a general-equilibrium framework, and formalizes many of the mecha-
nisms discussed by Domar (1970). (See also Conning 2003.) However, his
setting is static, and fertility and population are treated as exogenous, so
the model cannot really explain the facts we focus on here. (Section 1.2
below discusses the facts in more detail.) We find Conning’s (2004) model
complementary to ours.
Contractual relationships between land and labor in agricultural economies
is the subject of a large literature (see e.g. Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak
2002, Conning and Robinson 2006, and further references in these). How-
4Some classic works are Conrad and Meyer (1958) and Fogel and Engerman (1974).
For an overview, see Hughes and Cain (1998, Ch. 10).
5See e.g. Curtin (1998). Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) discuss slavery in the context
of Latin America’s post-colonial growth experience.
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ever, this literature does not share our very long-run perspective, going back
to pre-agricultural times, and typically abstracts from property rights in hu-
mans (slavery) and how demographic and technological change can cause
transitions from one institution to another.6
Theories on property rights include Demsetz (1967), who proposes an
eﬃciency explanation, attributing their origin to increasing importance to
internalize externalities. Our explanation rather focuses on their redistribu-
tive role. In a sense, this is not so much about the origin of property rights,
as their reallocation: for example, the introduction of slavery can be inter-
preted as property rights to agents’ labor being transferred from the agents
themselves to the elite.
Our paper also relates to a recent literature on long-run economic and
demographic development. We share some single components with this lit-
erature, like the focus on: land and agriculture (Ko¨gel and Prskawetz 2001;
Gollin, Parente and Rogerson 2002; Hansen and Prescott 2002; Lucas 2002);
fertility (Galor and Weil 2000; Jones 2001; Tamura 2001; Galor and Moav
2002; Galor and Mountford 2006; Lagerlo¨f 2003a,b, 2005); and institutions
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson
2006). However, none of these papers models institutional transformations
of human societies endogenously; certainly nothing as complete as what we
describe here: from egalitarianism into slavery, and further on into free labor.
In that regard, our modelling approach is conceptually closer to a liter-
ature on the origin of property rights. (See e.g. Skaperdas 1992, Hirshleifer
1995, Grossman 2001, Piccione and Rubinstein 2003, Hafer 2006, and further
references in these, for models of property rights and conflicts.) The central
6See, however, Baker (2002) and Marceau and Myers (2006) for models of landowner-
ship in pre-agricultural environments.
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theme which we share with these papers is that the exogenous component is
not the property rights institution itself, but rather the technologies used in
appropriation and production. Appropriation in our model amounts to en-
slaving an agent (i.e., stealing his labor), which requires an input of guards
who do not produce food but still need to be fed.
1.2 The facts
Long-run human history is characterized by increasingly productive ways
to use land: from hunting and gathering, via diﬀerent stages of horticul-
ture (farming without plows, like “slash-and-burn” cultivation), to agricul-
ture (plow-based farming). As food production has evolved, so have other
features of human societies, such as population density, the degree of strat-
ification, gender roles, and technologies (e.g., the use of metal weapons and
tools). All these changes do not happen at exactly the same stage of agri-
cultural development across societies and regions, but the trend tends to go
in the same direction when going from one stage to the next, e.g. from low
population density to higher (see Diamond 1997, Flannery 1972, Nolan and
Lenski 1999, Wright 2000).
Slavery is an exception. It was rarely practiced among hunter-gatherers,
or among the most advanced agrarian societies: in Western Europe serfdom
(which can be thought of as a mild form of slavery) had been replaced by
free labor several centuries before the industrial revolution.7 It is rather at
7In the first chapter of “Time On the Cross” Fogel and Engerman (1974, p. 12) note
that slavery “came into being at the dawn of civilization, when mankind passed from
hunting and nomadic pastoral life into primitive agriculture.” According to North and
Thomas (1971, p. 780) serfdom in Western Europe was “in an advanced state of decay by
the end of the fifteenth century.” See also Eltis (2000, Ch. 1).
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intermediate levels of development that slavery shows up.
Consider some descriptive numbers based on the so-called Ethnographic
Atlas, a data set consisting of some thousand human societies, both historic
and present.8 Figure 1 shows how average population density, landownership,
and slavery vary across societies at diﬀerent stages of agricultural develop-
ment.9 As seen, when transiting from hunting and gathering to agriculture,
population density rises. This is not surprising: the more productive is agri-
cultural technology, the more mouths can be fed. Figure 1 also shows the
percent societies at a particular stage of development in which ownership to
land is present. As seen, in the process of agricultural development ownership
to land becomes more common. Diﬀerent from the case with landownership,
however, slavery, which essentially amounts to ownership of people, is most
common among advanced horticultural societies, and less common among
both hunter-gatherers and agrarian societies.10
The pattern for slavery in Figure 1 would be even clearer if we introduced
a final industrial stage, at which slavery had vanished altogether. One could
then describe the facts so that slavery began its decline in the agrarian stage,
and ended it in the industrial stage. (The extension presented in Section 4.1
could be interpreted as capturing the transition into an industrial stage.)
With some simplification, one may thus describe this long-run process
as passing through three stages. The first is an egalitarian stage, without
property rights to land or people. The second stage is a slave society where
8This is a data set compiled originally by the anthropologist G.P Murdock. See Mur-
dock (1967, pp. 3-6) for details.
9Figure 1 is based on numbers cited from Nolan and Lenski (1999). Simple horticultural
societies in Figure 1 are distinguished from advanced by the use metallurgy in the latter.
10See also Patterson (1977), who documents a similar pattern when looking at a smaller
subset of the Ethnographic Atlas.
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both humans and land are held as property. At the final stage land is owned,
but ownership to humans (slavery) is not practiced. In the next section we
set up one unified growth model, which can replicate the transition through
each of these three stages.
2 The Model
There are several land areas, or societies, each populated at time t by a
continuum of (adult) agents of mass Pt, referred to by the male pronoun. A
finite number of these agents belong to an (internal) elite, who do not work.
The remainder are referred to as non-elite agents. Both (internal) elite and
non-elite agents live in overlapping generations for two periods, adulthood
and childhood. Children make no decisions, but carry a cost, q, to rear.
Outside each society live an “external” elite of mass one, who may be
thought of as a foreign power. These agents are identical to the internal elite
(e.g., they do not work), except that they are infinitely lived and have no
influence over the choice of institution. However, the internal elite need their
help to seize ownership of the land.
Adult agents spend income on own consumption and child rearing. For
the moment, denote this income by wt. We can then write an agent’s budget
constraint as
ct = wt − qnt, (1)
where ct is his consumption, and nt is his number of children.
Labor supply is indivisible, so that a (non-elite) agent supplies either one
unit of labor, or none. Work requires energy: the agent must eat a certain
amount of food, c, to be able to work. We call c subsistence consumption.
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To capture this, we let preferences take this form:
V workt =



(1− β) ln ct + β lnnt if ct ≥ c,
−∞ if ct < c.
(2)
Solving the utility maximization problem amounts to maximizing the first
line in (2), subject to the constraint that ct ≥ c (and whatever other con-
straints are relevant).
For an agent who is not working (which would here be the internal and
external elites) the first line in (2) extends to the case when ct < c:
11
V no workt = (1− β) ln ct + β lnnt. (3)
2.1 The three institutions
The internal elites across all societies collectively choose one of three in-
stitutions. Under an egalitarian institution output (or land) is divided
equally among non-elite agents and the internal elite12; the external elite get
nothing. The other two institutions amount to the internal elite joining the
external elite to enclose (seize exclusive ownership of) the land. Under a
slavery institution the elite own both the land and the non-elite agents’
labor, making the agents slaves. These must be paid subsistence to be able
to work, as must a fixed number of guards per slave. Under a free labor
institution the non-elite agents own their own labor and can migrate to
work in other societies.
11The distinction between working and non-working agents’ utilities is not crucial for
any of our results, but facilitates the algebra somewhat when comparing payoﬀs later.
In particular, as long as the non-working agent earns an income above c/(1 − β) this
distinction will not matter.
12We can interpret the model so that the internal elite can work under the egalitarian
institution, which can then be thought of as equal division of land, rather than output.
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2.2 Timing
In each period, events unfold as follows.
(1) Pt agents (born in the previous period) enter as adults into each
society, and technology, At, is given.
(2) Taking as given At and Pt, the internal elites across all societies first
decide collectively whether, or not, to enclose the land in each society. To
enclose the land, they need the help of the external elites, with whom they
must share profits; following the enclosure they then choose either slavery or
free labor. If they choose no enclosure (egalitarianism), they share output
equally with the non-elite agents; the external elite get nothing.
(3) Non-elite agents may migrate, if the institution chosen under (2) is
not slavery.
(4) Factor prices are determined and payoﬀs to the elites are realized.
(5) Non-elite agents and elites make consumption and fertility decisions,
which update population to Pt+1. A technology production function updates
technology to At+1.
A couple of things are worth noting. First, there are no conflicts between
the internal elites of diﬀerent societies at stage (2): because all societies are
identical, they unanimously (e.g., through voting) choose the institution that
maximizes their payoﬀs at stage (4). (The non-elite agents and the external
elites have no say.)
Second, the internal elites can cooperate only when choosing the insti-
tution, but not in other ways. For example, having chosen free labor, they
cannot collude on paying a subsistence wage to free workers.13 (If they could,
that would make workers slaves without needing to guard them.) This seems
13See e.g. Conning (2003) for a model where landholders exert market power.
13
realistic, but is not a necessary assumption. The results change very little if
there is no cooperation at all between the internal elites across societies, as
is discussed in Section 2.6 (see also Lagerlo¨f 2006).
In what follows, unless otherwise stated, the term “elite” will refer to the
internal elite if the institution is egalitarianism, and to the internal and ex-
ternal elite collectively if the institution is slavery or free labor. By “agents”
we shall mean non-elite agents when there is no risk of confusion.
2.3 Production
Total output in period t, Yt, depends on the society’s total amount of land,
M ; agricultural productivity, eAt; and the amount of labor working the land,
Lt:
Yt =
³
M eAt´α L1−αt ≡ Aαt L1−αt , (4)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the land share of output, and At = M eAt denotes the
productivity-augmented size of the land. In other words, At can increase
either due to a rise in the productivity of land, or due to an increase in the
amount of available land (e.g., the discovery of new continents).
2.4 The elite’s payoﬀ
Denote the (internal) elite’s payoﬀ by πit, where i indicates the institution:
egalitarianism (i = E), free labor (i = F ), and slavery (i = S).
2.4.1 Payoﬀ in an egalitarian society
Consider first the egalitarian institution. Here, each agent consumes the
average product, and that the elite’s payoﬀ is the same as that of every other
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agent, and given by14
πEt = Aαt P−αt . (5)
We implicitly assume that agents are able to work earning the average prod-
uct (Aαt P
−α
t ≥ c). We can choose initial conditions, (A0, P0), to ensure that
this holds along the whole path (see Section 3.3 below).
2.4.2 Payoﬀ in a free labor society
Consider next the free labor institution. Here the (internal and external)
elite own all land. Agents are landless but can migrate across societies. As
a result, the elite hire labor on a competitive market taking the wage rate,
wt, as given.
15 Their payoﬀ is thus given by
πFt = max
Lt
©
Aαt L
1−α
t − wtLt
ª
. (6)
Solving the maximization problem leads to a labor demand function:
wt = (1− α)Aαt L−αt . (7)
Since an agent must eat c to be able to work, labor supply is given by
Lt =



Pt if wt ≥ c,
0 if wt < c.
(8)
14This can be derived by dividing total output, Aαt P
1−α
t , equally across all Pt agents (the
internal elite and non-elite agents). Alternatively, each agent may be allocated property
over a share 1/Pt of the (productivity-augmented) land, At. With his unit time endowment
he then produces [(1/Pt)At]
α(1)1−α = Aαt Pt
−α. The latter interpretation assumes that
the (internal) elite can work under egalitarianism.
15The free labor institution is here modelled as each member of the elite running a farm
as his own estate. Equivalently, given the constant-returns-to-scale production function,
agents could rent land from the elite.
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Depending on At and Pt there are now two possible types of equilibrium:
one where all agents work, and one where only some of them work. Consider
first Case A. This is a society with a relatively small population, so that all
agents can work and the marginal product of labor still exceeds subsistence
consumption, i.e., (1 − α)Aαt P−αt > c, or At > [c/(1− α)]
1/α Pt. The elite
simply keep the land share of output, given by Aαt P
1−α
t − wtPt, where wt =
(1− α)Aαt P−αt , i.e.,
πFt = αAαt P 1−αt . (9)
Next, consider Case B. This refers to a situation where only some of the
agents work and eat; the rest starve and/or die, and the equilibrium wage is
kept down to subsistence. Put diﬀerently, the number of agents working, Lt,
is determined by setting the marginal product of labor equal to subsistence
consumption: (1 − α)Aαt L−αt = c, or Lt = [(1− α)/c]
1/αAt. Inserted into
Aαt L
1−α
t − cLt this gives the payoﬀ to the elite as:
πFt = α
·
1− α
c
¸ 1−α
α
At. (10)
We can thus write:
πFt =



αAαt P 1−αt if At >
£
c
1−α
¤ 1
α Pt,
α
£
1−α
c
¤ 1−α
α At if At ≤
£
c
1−α
¤ 1
α Pt.
(11)
Note that, as long as At > [c/(1− α)]1/α Pt (and thus wt > c), total out-
put equals Aαt P
1−α
t under both egalitarianism and free labor. In other words,
no eﬃciency gains arise from the enclosure of the land, only a redistribution of
resources from non-elite agents to the elite. If At ≥ [c/(1− α)]1/α Pt output
is in fact lower under free labor because not all agents can survive and work
with a competitive wage; an enclosure is then associated with an eﬃciency
loss.
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Note also that workers are always better oﬀ under egalitarianism than free
labor: the average product, (At/Pt)
α, always exceeds the marginal product,
(1− α)(At/Pt)α.16
2.4.3 Payoﬀ in a slave society
Consider finally the slavery institution. Like under free labor, the (internal
and external) elite own all land, but now non-elite agents are slaves. Each
slave is paid the minimal amount required to keep him productive, c. To
prevent slaves from running away requires γ agents to guard each slave. We
let each guard’s consumption be kept to the same level as that of the slaves,
c.17 Then the cost of keeping St slaves equals (1 + γ)cSt.
As will be seen, to ensure that slavery can ever dominate the other two
institutions we must assume that the guarding cost is not too high:
Assumption 1 α(1 + γ)1−α < 1.
Under slavery the elite can dispose freely of agents, and not all need to
be held as slaves or guards; some may be killed (or given zero income so that
they starve). The maximum number of slaves is restricted by the number
of agents, Pt, minus the guards needed to watch over them (which, recall,
16This result relates to Samuelson’s (1974) negative reply to the question “Is the Rent-
Collector Worthy of His Full Hire?”
17We thus assume that guards are slaves too, and that they (like workers) must be
watched over by other guards. More precisely, let eγ < 1 be the number of guards needed
to watch each slave (guard or worker). The cost of keeping St working slaves then becomes:
cSt + ceγSt + ceγ2St + ... = cSt/(1− eγ),
which is equivalent to our formulation, if γ = eγ/(1− eγ).
17
amounts to γ per slave). Therefore, the number of slaves cannot exceed
Pt/(1 + γ), so the payoﬀ under slavery is given by
πSt = max
St≤Pt/(1+γ)
©
Aαt S
1−α
t − (1 + γ)cSt
ª
. (12)
Let S∗t denote the unconstrained choice of St in (12) above, given by (1 −
α)Aαt S−αt − (1 + γ)c = 0, i.e.,
S∗t =
·
1− α
(1 + γ)c
¸ 1
α
At. (13)
The elite are unconstrained if the desired number of slaves, plus the γS∗t
guards needed to guard them, are fewer than the total population.18 This
holds if S∗t (1 + γ) ≤ Pt, or
At ≤
µ
1
1 + γ
¶·
c(1 + γ)
1− α
¸ 1
α
Pt ≡ Γ(Pt; γ). (14)
Call this Case 1. This amounts to keeping S∗t agents as slaves, and γS∗t
guarding the slaves; the remainder are killed. The payoﬀ is then given by
Aαt S
∗1−α
t − (1 + γ)cS∗t , which together with (13) and some algebra gives:
πSt = α
·
1− α
(1 + γ)c
¸ 1−α
α
At. (15)
Next, consider Case 2, where the elite is constrained [i.e., At > Γ(Pt; γ)].
Thus, Pt/(1+γ) agents are kept as slaves, and the remainder used for guard-
ing the slaves. The payoﬀ is thus given by:
πSt = Aαt
µ
Pt
1 + γ
¶1−α
− cPt. (16)
We can thus write:
πSt =



Aαt
³
Pt
1+γ
´1−α
− cPt if At > Γ(Pt; γ),
α
h
1−α
(1+γ)c
i 1−α
α
At if At ≤ Γ(Pt; γ).
(17)
18It can be seen that, in this case, slavery will be dominated by free labor.
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An alternative way to derive the payoﬀ in (17) is to let slaves be traded
on a market at an endogenously given slave price. The slave price being
positive in equilibrium can then be seen to be equivalent to At > Γ(Pt; γ)
(see Lagerlo¨f 2006).
2.4.4 A principal-agent interpretation of slavery and free labor
The payoﬀs under free labor and slavery can be derived from a principal-agent
setting (see Lagerlo¨f 2006). The principal (the elite) chooses how much to pay
each agent (slave or free worker), subject to three constraints. An incentive
compatibility constraint states that the worker voluntarily chooses to work
(exert eﬀort); this requires that he is fed at least c (i.e., exerting eﬀort costs
c units of energy to the agent). A limited liability constraint constitutes a
non-negativity restriction on payments to agents, regardless of eﬀort level.
Finally, a participation constraint requires that the agent does not run away:
either guards can make running away impossible (slavery), or the worker can
be paid as much as his best outside option (free labor).
The idea that guards prevent slaves from running away fits with evidence
from some slave societies. For example, slave patrols in the U.S. South were
used to catch runaway slaves (Hadden 2001). One can alternatively think of
guards as inflicting pain on slaves who do not work. That would amount to
a diﬀerent formulation of the limited liability constraint, so that the agent
could be made worse oﬀ if not working than merely losing his pay.
2.5 Comparing payoﬀs
The next step is to examine which payoﬀ is larger: πEt , πFt , or πSt , as given
by (5), (11), and (17), respectively.
19
Distinguishing between internal and external elites has served to make
these payoﬀ comparisons technically correct. Intuitively, the internal elite
are a finite number of agents, and thus vanishingly small compared to the
non-elite population, so under egalitarianism their share of the pie is also
vanishingly small, and always less than the non-negligible fractions taken
under slavery and free labor. However, πFt and πSt in (11) and (17) are di-
vided among a continuum of agents of mass one, making them of the same
order as πEt in (5). The elite eﬀectively changes size from zero to unit mass
when institutions change. The interpretation is that the internal elites de-
cide what group to share output with: either the domestic non-elite agents
(egalitarianism), or an external elite (landownership).19
The payoﬀs all depend on agricultural technology, At, and population
size, Pt (and exogenous parameters), which thus determine what institution
dominates the other two. Ranking the payoﬀs is algebraically quite messy,
due to the way the subsistence consumption constraint aﬀects how the payoﬀs
are calculated, forcing us to consider several diﬀerent cases. However, most
of the details can be dealt with in the Appendix; once we know which payoﬀ
pairs are relevant for the comparisons we make, the results are quite intuitive.
Begin by defining
Ψ(P ) =
·
c(1 + γ)1−α
1− α(1 + γ)1−α
¸ 1
α
P , (18)
19Alternatively, we could let there be only one elite carrying unit mass. If this elite can
work under egalitarianism, total output equals Aαt (1+Pt)
1−α and the elite’s payoﬀ under
egalitarianism becomes πEt = Aαt (1 + Pt)−α. In such a setting, the qualitative results in
Proposition 1 below still hold, but the analysis is more complicated. See Lagerlo¨f (2006).
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where 1− α(1 + γ)1−α > 0 follows from Assumption 1;
Ω(P ) =
·
c(1 + γ)1−αP 1+α
P − (1 + γ)1−α
¸ 1
α
; (19)
and
Φ(P ) =
µ
1
α
¶ 1
1−α
·
c
1− α
¸ 1
α
P−(
α
1−α). (20)
These functions separate the state space into three sets:
SS = {(A,P ) ∈ R2+ : A ≥ max {Ψ(P ),Ω(P )} and P > (1 + γ)1−α},
SF = {(A,P ) ∈ R2+ : P ≥ 1/α and Φ(P ) ≤ A ≤ Ψ(P )},
SE = {(A,P ) ∈ R2+ : (A,P ) /∈ SS ∪ SF}.
(21)
We can now state the following (proven in the Appendix):
Proposition 1 The payoﬀs associated with slavery, egalitarianism, and free
labor are ordered as follows:
(a) Slavery (weakly) dominates when
πSt ≥ max{πFt , πEt }⇐⇒ (At, Pt) ∈ SS. (22)
(b) Free labor (weakly) dominates when
πFt ≥ max{πSt ,πEt }⇐⇒ (At, Pt) ∈ SF . (23)
(c) Egalitarianism (strictly) dominates otherwise, i.e., when (At, Pt) ∈ SE.
This is illustrated in Figure 2. The institutional borders are straightfor-
ward to derive when we know the relevant payoﬀs to compare. As shown in
the Appendix, these are (with one exception): πSt = Aαt [Pt/(1+γ)]1−α− cPt,
πFt = αAαt P 1−αt , and πEt = Aαt P−αt . Some algebra then easily verifies that:
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πSt ≥ πFt when At ≥ Ψ(Pt); πSt ≥ πEt when At ≥ Ω(Pt) [if the denominator
in (19) is positive; else πSt < πEt ]; and πFt ≥ πEt when Pt ≥ 1/α.20
Slavery thus dominates the other two institutions when At ≥ Ψ(Pt) and
At ≥ Ω(Pt), i.e., at high enough levels of land productivity, At, and interme-
diate population levels, Pt. The productivity of land determines the size of
the pie to be split; the larger is the pie, the greater is the reward to taking a
larger fraction of it at the cost of diminishing its size a little, which is what
slavery amounts to doing.
The impact of population size works through the marginal product of
labor. If labor is scarce, keeping workers as guards is very costly, so slavery
is not an attractive option to the elite. Also, a high land-labor ratio implies
a low payoﬀ to owning the land and hiring free workers. The (internal)
elites may thus prefer egalitarianism, where their share is larger the smaller
is population. Vice versa, a very large population makes it attractive to own
land, since the marginal product of land is high. Also, a large population
favors free labor over slavery, because it implies a relatively low competitive
price on free workers, who do not need guards.
2.6 The equilibrium institution
We could instead look at what institution arises in equilibrium if the (inter-
nal) elites choose institutions independently, taking as given all other elites’
choices, rather than acting cooperatively. One may suspect this to generate
20When comparing the last pair of payoﬀs the exception shows up: for free labor to
dominate egalitarianism Pt ≥ 1/α is not suﬃcient. If the competitive wage rate is so low
that it does not cover the subsistence consumption of free workers, the relevant payoﬀ
under free labor is given by the second line in (11). Egalitarianism then turns out to
dominate free labor if At ≤ Φ(Pt).
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diﬀerent results because institutional choices carry many potential externali-
ties which are not internalized under the equilibrium approach. For example,
wages depend on aggregate labor supply and thus on the number of elites
choosing free labor.
However, as shown in Lagerlo¨f (2006), the equilibrium approach in fact
generates results which are similar to the optimal approach taken here. For
any given (At, Pt), there exists an equilibrium where all elites choose the same
institution as the one given in Proposition 1. This equilibrium need not be
unique: for example, there exists an interval around Pt = 1/α, where all
elites may choose egalitarianism, or all may choose free labor, in equilibrium.
However, if we make the (arguably plausible) assumption that the elites in
egalitarian societies can prevent immigration from free labor societies, even
uniqueness is guaranteed.
The mentioned externalities do not matter because they are neutralized
by symmetric eﬀects on the supply side. For example, by choosing free labor
the elite increase both supply and demand for free labor, by both freeing
their agents and hiring free workers. As long as all societies are identical
these demand and supply eﬀects cancel.
3 Dynamics
Having determined how the institution depends on population and agricul-
tural technology, we next look at how these evolve over time.
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3.1 Agricultural technology
We let At evolve according to
At+1 = A+D(At − A)1−θP θt , (24)
where D > 0, and θ ∈ (0, 1), and A > 0 is a minimum level of agricultural
technology, imposed to ensure the existence of steady states with non-growing
levels of At and Pt.
The Boserupian feature of this relationship is that At grows faster the
higher is population pressure, i.e., when Pt is large relative to At. One
example could be the very birth of farming, which may have followed the
extinction of big mammals, like the mammoth (Smith 1975, 1992). Other
examples could be intensified land use, or rising cropping frequency, in re-
sponse to increasing population density in agricultural societies. It could also
capture a scale eﬀect from population density to technological progress (see,
e.g., Kremer 1993, Nestmann and Klasen 2000, Lagerlo¨f 2003a).
3.2 Population
The population dynamics are more complicated, since fertility depends on
total income, how it is allocated (i.e., the institution), and whether, or not,
the subsistence consumption constraint binds for agents. However, we can
impose a parametric restriction which implies that, when it does bind, pop-
ulation is falling (see Assumption 2 below).
3.2.1 Population dynamics in a free labor society
The landowning (internal and external) unit-mass elite have nlandownert chil-
dren and the Pt workers have n
worker
t children each. Since all agents in the
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society die after adulthood, population dynamics are given by21
Pt+1 = n
worker
t Pt + n
landowner
t . (25)
Consider the elite’s fertility first. They do not work so the (ct ≥ c)-
constraint is irrelevant, and fertility is given by maximizing (3), subject to
(1), with πFt replacing wt. This gives nlandownert = βπFt /q.
For workers the (ct ≥ c)-constraint matters. Maximizing each worker’s
utility function in (2), subject to (1), gives the worker fertility rate as
nworkert =



wt−c
q
if wt <
c
1−β ,
βwt
q
if wt ≥ c1−β .
(26)
The case when wt < c/(1−β) complicates things, but is simplified by the
following assumption:
Assumption 2 βc
(1−β)q < 1− α.
We can now state the following:
Proposition 2 In a free labor society population evolves as follows:
(a) If wt ≥ c/(1− β),
Pt+1 =
βAαt P 1−αt
q
. (27)
(b) If wt < c/(1− β), population is falling: Pt+1 < Pt.
The proof is in the Appendix. Part (b) hinges on Assumption 2.
21Note that children of the external elite enter the society’s population as non-elite
agents.
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3.2.2 Population dynamics in an egalitarian society
In an egalitarian society all agents have the same income, which (recall) is
given by πEt = Aαt Pt−α [see (5)]. Let fertility be denoted n
egal
t , which is given
by maximizing (2) subject to ct = πEt − qnt. Fertility thus takes the same
form as in the free labor case in (26) above:
negalt =



πEt −c
q
if πEt < c1−β ,
βπEt
q
if πEt ≥ c1−β .
Since all Pt agents have the same fertility it must hold that Pt+1 = Ptn
egal
t .
(The external elite have no income and thus zero fertility.) We can now state
the following:
Proposition 3 In an egalitarian society population evolves as follows:
(a) If πEt ≥ c/(1− β), Pt+1 is given by (27).
(b) If πEt < c/(1− β), population is falling: Pt+1 < Pt.
The proof is in the Appendix. Again, part (b) uses Assumption 2.
3.2.3 Population dynamics in a slave society
In a slave society, the consumption of slaves is constrained to subsistence.
Given the way we have formulated preferences in (2), slave fertility is thus
zero, and all children are fathered by the (internal and external) elite.22 This
is consistent with the historical evidence. In despotic societies (corresponding
to slave societies here) elites have been strongly polygynous in both mating
and marriage, with rich rulers having more wives and oﬀspring than their
22The feature that the elite rear all children is not important. Introducing, for example,
a subsistence level for fertility in (2), as we have for consumption, slaves too would have
some oﬀspring.
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subjects; hunter-gatherer societies, and free societies (like the one we live in
today), have been more monogamous, displaying a more equal distribution
of women and fertility (Betzig 1986, Wright 1994).23
Thus, population in period t+ 1 is given by the elite’s fertility in period
t, denoted nslaveownert . This is given by maximizing (3), subject to (1), with
πSt replacing wt, giving nslaveownert = βπSt /q. We can now state the following:
Proposition 4 In a slave society, population evolves as follows:
(a) If At > Γ(Pt; γ),
Pt+1 =
β
q
"
Aαt
µ
Pt
1 + γ
¶1−α
− cPt
#
. (28)
(b) If At ≤ Γ(Pt; γ), population is falling: Pt+1 < Pt.
The proof is in the Appendix. Again, part (b) uses Assumption 2.
3.3 The phase diagram
To analyze the dynamics ofAt and Pt in a phase diagram we begin by deriving
expressions for the loci along which At and Pt are constant.
Proposition 5 (a) Population is constant (Pt+1 = Pt) when
At =



³
q
β
´ 1
α
Pt ≡ LE/F(Pt) if (At, Pt) ∈ SE ∪ SF ,
(1 + γ) 1−αα
³
q
β + c
´ 1
α
Pt ≡ LS(Pt) if (At, Pt) ∈ SS.
(29)
23Polygynous mating habits were widespread among the elites of all early human civ-
ilizations in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, India, and Middle and South America (Betzig
1993), and in the Roman Empire (Betzig 1992). The Mongolian Empire is another ex-
ample: geneticists have estimated that, across a large region of Asia from the Pacific to
the Caspian Sea, about 8% of the male population (16 million men) are descendents of
Genghis Kahn (Zerjal et al. 2003). See also Lagerlo¨f (2005).
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(b) Technology is constant (At+1 = At) when
At = A+D
1
θPt ≡ LA(Pt). (30)
Proof : Part (a) follows from Propositions 2, 3, and 4. Part (b) follows
from (24). k
Examples of these loci are shown in Figures 3 and 4. A steady state
is a point where both At and Pt are constant, as given by an intersection
of the functions in (29) and (30). The motion arrows show how the state
variables evolve oﬀ the loci. Exogenous parameters determine the shape of
the loci, and in what institutional regions the steady state(s) lie (if any steady
state exists at all). Initial conditions, (A0, P0), determine what regions the
economy passes in the transition.
Note that it follows from (5), (29), and Assumption 2 that for any econ-
omy starting oﬀ in the egalitarian region above LE/F(Pt), it must hold that
πEt > c along the path throughout the egalitarian region.
The following proposition tells us when a free labor or egalitarian steady
state may exist.
Proposition 6 (a) If, and only if,µ
q
β
¶ 1
α
> D
1
θ , (31)
q
β ≤
c(1 + γ)1−α
1− α(1 + γ)1−α , (32)
then there exists a finite A
F
> 0, such that for any A ≥ AF there exists a
steady state in the free labor region, SF .
(b) If, and only if, (31) holds, then for some (suﬃciently small) A > 0 there
exists a steady state in the egalitarian region, SE.
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The proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, the condition in (31) ensures
that the mutually reinforcing Boserupian and Malthusian forces are weak
enough so that, under the free-labor/egalitarian population dynamics in (27),
population and technology converge in levels. The condition in (32) ensures
that the cost of children (q) is low enough, and the utility weight on children
(β) is high enough, so that population is not falling throughout the free labor
region; in terms of Figure 3, (32) ensures that LE/F(Pt) is flatter than Ψ(Pt).
We can then choose A to make LA(Pt) intersect L
E/F(Pt) in either the free
labor, or the egalitarian, region (but not in both).24
Next we examine when a steady state with slavery may exist.
Proposition 7 If, and only if,
(1 + γ) 1−αα
µ
q
β + c
¶ 1
α
> D
1
θ , (33)
q
β ≥
αc(1 + γ)1−α
1− α(1 + γ)1−α , (34)
then there exists a finite A
S
> 0, such that for any A ≥ AS there exists a
steady state in the slavery region, SS.
The proof is the Appendix. The intuition resembles that behind Proposi-
tion 6. If (33) holds population and technology converge in levels. This con-
dition is weaker than (31), because for any given (At, Pt) population growth is
slower under slavery than under the other two institutions [cf. (27) and (28)];
this follows from total income under slavery being lower because agents are
used as unproductive guards. The condition in (34) implies that the child
24From (29) and (30), the levels of At and Pt in a steady state with free labor or
egalitarianism are P ∗ = A/[(β/q) 1α −D 1θ ], and A∗ = (β/q) 1αA/[(β/q) 1α −D 1θ ].
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cost and preference parameters (q and β) are such that population is not
growing throughout the slavery region. That is, using (18), (29), and some
algebra, it is seen that (34) ensures that LS(Pt) is steeper than Ψ(Pt) (cf.
Figure 4). We can then choose A to make LA(Pt) intersect L
S(Pt) in the
slavery region.25
3.3.1 A full transition
Figure 3 illustrates the case when a steady state with free labor exists, but
none with slavery (or egalitarianism). That is, the conditions in Proposition
6 (a) hold, but not those in Proposition 7,26 and A exceeds A
F
. We can now
choose initial conditions so that the economy passes all three institutional
regions. To see this, let the economy start oﬀ within the egalitarian region,
above A. [Note from (24) that At cannot fall below A.] If this initial point
is close to the slavery region the path goes through the slavery region before
converging to the steady state in the free labor region. Such a trajectory is
illustrated in Figure 3.27
25From (29) and (30), the levels of At and Pt in a steady state with slavery are:
P ∗ =
A
(1 + γ) 1−αα (β/q + c) 1α −D 1θ
,
A∗ =
(1 + γ) 1−αα (β/q + c) 1αA
(1 + γ) 1−αα (β/q + c) 1α −D 1θ
.
26More precisely, (34) does not hold, and therefore LS(Pt) does not pass through SS .
However, because (31) holds, so does (33).
27Figure 3 only shows the qualitative dynamics, i.e., the direction in which technology
and population move. In fact, the trajectory will not be a straight line; its path changes
slope as the economy enters the slavery region, where it starts to evolve according to
(28) instead of (27). However, as long as the inequality in (34) is reversed, population
continually grows in the slavery region, and eventually exits into the free labor region.
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In this transition, population and technology grow in tandem through
mutual reinforcement: advances in agricultural technology raise incomes and
thus generate population growth in a Malthusian fashion; this feeds back into
more technological progress through the Boserupian eﬀect.
3.3.2 Multiple steady states
As illustrated in Figure 4, a steady state in the free labor region may coexist
with one in the slavery region.28 This requires that the conditions in both
Proposition 6 (a), and Proposition 7 hold, and that A exceeds both A
F
and
A
S
. That is, q/β lies on the interval defined by the right-hand sides of (34)
and (32). Both steady states can be seen to be locally stable, so that an econ-
omy which enters the slavery region never exits, and likewise for an economy
which enters the free labor region (absent shocks to population, technology,
or exogenous parameters). Initial conditions thus determine where the econ-
omy ends up. The slavery steady state is a stagnant trap in the sense that
it has relatively low levels of both population and technology.
Figure 4 may illustrate how two groups of societies (two empires, if you
wish) may co-exist, one in the slavery trap, and one in the free labor region.
The free labor society has larger population and higher levels of technology.
One can also imagine a scenario where one society is initially leading but
converges to a slavery trap, and another society starts oﬀ behind in the
egalitarian region, but follows a trajectory into free labor. (The two societies
could have diﬀerent initial conditions, or be subject to diﬀerent shocks.)
Such changing leadership may capture something about Western Europe’s
overtaking of other (more despotic, less free) Eurasian regions in the centuries
28However, a steady state in the free labor region cannot coexist with one in the egali-
tarian region, since LE/F(Pt) cannot intersect LA(Pt) more than once.
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leading up to the industrial revolution (cf. Landes 1999).
4 Discussion
4.1 Industrial technology and Fenoaltea (1984)
This model has the feature that (all else equal) slavery tends to dominate
over free labor in more technologically advanced societies. This fits with
some examples: the U.S. South during the slave era was more technologically
advanced than Western Europe when serfdom ended there; Prussian serfdom
was technologically superior to the free labor system that preceded it.
However, there is one problem with this feature of the model. A couple of
hundred years ago, (parts of) the world experienced accelerating growth in
technology, followed by declining population growth: an industrial revolution
and a demographic transition. This would suggest that the industrialized
world should return to slavery, quite contrary to the evidence.
There are extensions of our model where this does not happen. So far we
have talked about advances in pre-industrial technologies. Some argue that
slavery died out due to the rise of industrial production modes, involving a
larger number of work tasks, thus making slavery more costly in terms of
supervision.29 Put diﬀerently, industrial production is more “care intensive”
as opposed to “eﬀort intensive.” In essence, this is what Fenoaltea (1984)
suggests.
To model this in more detail we could let the slave have better information
about how long time each task takes, or the quality of the work performed.
29By “industrial production modes” we here mean that they involve many tasks. For
example, on manors in feudal Europe, serfs were used, rather than chattel slaves, because
of the many tasks involved (North and Thomas 1973, p. 20).
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In more multi-task environments, an award system closer to that of free labor
may then be more cost eﬃcient.30
To introduce a similar mechanism within the framework applied here we
can assume that the number of guards needed per slave, γ, begins to increase
in At once production leaves the agrarian mode, and enters an industrial
mode. Define this as At exceeding some threshold, eA. Thus, for At ≥ eA,
the payoﬀ under slavery, πSt , may increase less (relative to πFt and πEt ) in
response to advances in At.
The qualitative change is illustrated in Figure 5.31 For At ≤ eA, the di-
agram is identical to that in Figure 2. For At ≥ eA, the new institutional
borders are denoted eΩ(Pt) and eΨ(Pt). Compared to Figure 2, the free labor
and egalitarian regions are larger at the expense of the slavery region, re-
flecting that slavery is more expensive in terms of supervision. For At high
enough, slavery never dominates. In this setting slavery must eventually die
out if either population or technology exhibit sustained growth.
30Aghion and Tirole (1997) is one example of a principle-agent model where the principal
(here a slaveowning elite) may find it in his interest to transfer formal authority (freedom)
to the agent (the slave). See also Banerjee et al. (2002) and the discussion in Section
2.4.4.
31Figure 5 is drawn letting the number of guards per slave be given by
γ(At) =



γ if At ≤ eA,
(1 + γ)(At/ eA)θ − 1 if At ≥ eA,
where γ > 0, and eA > 0. It can be seen that a slavery region exists for large enough eA.
See Lagerlo¨f (2006) for details.
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4.2 Empirical applications
4.2.1 An exogenous increase in the supply of land
In this model, an exogenous increase in the supply of land at any given
population size can be thought of as a fall in population per unit of land,
and thus a movement to the left on the Pt-axis in any of the phase diagrams.
[Alternatively, it can be thought of as an upward shift on the At-axis due to
a rise in M ; see (4)]. This may cause a (reversed) transition from free labor
to slavery.
Domar (1970) provides two examples of such scenarios. First, the discov-
ery of the Americas, at the time when serfdom and slavery had died out in
most of Europe, led to the reintroduction of slavery on a large scale. The
other example is the Russian 16th century military land conquests, which
expanded Russian territory and made peasants migrate to these new lands.
Landowners (by lobbying the central government) then imposed restrictions
on the peasants’ freedom of movement, thus introducing serfdom.
4.2.2 Slavery in the Americas
Consistent with our model, slavery in the Americas was used mostly where
the marginal product of labor was high, i.e., in regions where valuable com-
modities could be grown (Sokoloﬀ and Engerman 2000).
It also seems that scarcity of free (white) labor meant more (African)
slave imports. Slavery was less common where Europeans migrated, i.e.,
to regions with a temperate climate, and low (European settler) mortality
(cf. Coelho and McGuire 1997; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Mitchener and
Mclean 2003, p. 93).
Preceding African slavery was the practice of white servitude, meaning
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that European migrants paid for the ticket across the Atlantic by committing
to a work contract. White servitude was not comparable to chattel slavery,
but neither was it the same as free labor. For example, the work process
often involved physical punishment (see Grubb 1994, Emmer 1986). White
servitude seems to have been driven by labor shortage, being practiced in
e.g. the sparsely populated Canada, but absent in Latin America, where
native labor was more abundant. It seems to have vanished with advances
in shipping, which made some regions experience an inflow of free migrants,
and others African slaves.
4.2.3 European serfdom and the Black Death
The centuries leading up to the Black Death in Europe saw fast population
growth, explaining the decline of serfdom in this period (Domar 1970, pp.
27-28). However, the fall in population following the Black Death did not
lead to a transition back to slavery, or serfdom, as our model may suggest.
However, attempts to reintroduce serfdom were made. These failed due
to a lack of a central authority able to control peasants’ movements (see, e.g.,
North and Thomas 1971). An extension of our model which could capture
this would be one where freedom gradually empowers agents, making the
cost of guarding, γ, increase. Note also that a fall in population in our model
will always make workers better oﬀ as long as the economy does not transit
back into slavery. This is perfectly consistent with the rise in living standards
following the Black Death.
As a final point, in a wider historical perspective the population reduction
following the Black Death may not have been large enough. According to
McEvedy and Jones (1978, p. 18) European population fell from 79 million
in 1350 to 60 million in 1400 (back to the levels of 1200; it had recovered
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by 1500). By comparison, population at the time of the fall of the Roman
Empire in A.D. 600 was 26 million.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a unified explanation of a long-run three-stage process
through which human societies, from hunter-gatherer times up until recently,
have changed property rights institutions. In our model, an economy starting
oﬀ in an egalitarian state with communal property rights transits endoge-
nously into a despotic slave society, where the elite own both people and
land. Thereafter it transits endogenously into a free labor society, where the
elite own the land, but people are free.
The institution at any point in time is selected according to what max-
imizes the elites’ payoﬀs. Two state variables, agricultural technology and
population, grow endogenously over time. In an initial state with low lev-
els of technology and small population an egalitarian regime dominates. As
population and technology expand the egalitarian regime is replaced by a
slave regime. Further population expansion pushes the economy from slav-
ery into free labor, by lowering the marginal product of labor, and thus the
wage rate. As a potentially countervailing force, however, growth in technol-
ogy may keep the marginal product of labor from declining, thus making the
economy either re-enter a slavery state, or never leave it. However, allowing
for rising costs of guarding as industrial (or multi-task) production modes
are introduced, slavery must always die out if population and/or technology
keep growing.
In this model, transitions from one institution to another do not involve
conflicts, because all societies are identical. To relax this assumption we
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could assume that slave labor is relatively more productive in some societies
compared to others. For example, climate may determine which crops can be
grown, and some crops (like cotton, tobacco, and sugar) can be more suitable
for slave labor than others (Sokoloﬀ and Engerman 2000). Then the type
of externalities discussed in Section 2.6 matter: some elites may e.g. want
other elites to free their slaves to reduce wages. This may describe conflicts
between U.S. states in the 19th century.
Our aim has been to seek an ultimate, as opposed to proximate, expla-
nation of the rise and fall of slavery (cf. Diamond 1997). Another approach
would be to explain the rise or downfall of slavery in one particular context,
by one particular event (or set of events), e.g. the Civil War in the case of
the U.S. This would leave open the question what caused that event, and
would not explain why similar scenarios played out elsewhere, in other con-
texts (e.g. the decline of serfdom in Europe), and sometimes in the reverse
(e.g. the re-birth of slavery after the discovery of the Americas). To find an
ultimate explanation we must identify the underlying economic fundamentals
that determine institutions. This of course comes at the cost of leaving many
proximate factors out, i.e., “black-boxing” how fundamental economic con-
ditions transmit themselves into institutional outcomes. Opening this box is
an important challenge for future work.
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APPENDIX. PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof is done by first finding conditions for
πSt ≥ πEt , πFt ≥ πEt , and πFt ≥ πSt , and then deriving conditions for πSt ≥
max
©
πFt ,πEt
ª
, πFt ≥ max
©
πEt ,πSt
ª
, and πEt ≥ max
©
πFt ,πSt
ª
.
Conditions for πSt ≥ πEt : Here we need to distinguish between two cases
for calculating πSt . Consider first Case 1, which upon recalling (14) can be
written as At ≤ Γ(Pt; γ). Using (5) and the second line of (17), we see that
πSt ≥ πEt when α{(1− α)/[(1 + γ)c]}
1−α
α At ≥ Aαt P−αt , or
At ≥
µ
1
α
¶ 1
1−α
·
c(1 + γ)
1− α
¸ 1
α
(Pt)
−( α1−α) ≡ Λ(Pt). (A1)
Consider next Case 2: At > Γ(Pt; γ). Using (5) and the first line of (17),
we see that πSt ≥ πEt when Aαt (Pt/[1 + γ])
1−α− cPt ≥ Aαt P−αt . This requires
both that Pt > (1 + γ)1−α and At ≥ Ω(Pt), where Ω(Pt) is defined in (19).
Considering both cases together we thus conclude:
πSt ≥ πEt ⇐⇒ either Γ(Pt; γ) ≥ At ≥ Λ(Pt) or



At ≥ max {Ω(Pt),Γ(Pt; γ)}
and
Pt > (1 + γ)1−α



.
(A2)
Conditions for πFt ≥ πEt : Here we need to distinguish between the two
cases for calculating πFt . Consider first Case A: At > [c/(1− α)]
1
α Pt. Using
(5) and the first line in (11) we see that πFt ≥ πEt when αAαt P 1−αt ≥ Aαt P−αt ,
or
Pt ≥
1
α . (A3)
Consider next Case B: At ≤ [c/(1− α)]
1
α Pt. Using (5) and the second
line in (11) we see that πFt ≥ πEt when α [(1− α)/c]
1−α
α At ≥ Aαt P−αt . This
gives At ≥ Φ(Pt), where Φ(Pt) is defined in (20).
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It can be seen that [c/(1− α)]
1
α Pt is always greater than Φ(Pt) when Pt
exceeds 1/α. Considering both cases together we thus conclude:
πFt ≥ πEt ⇐⇒ Pt ≥
1
α and At ≥ Φ(Pt). (A4)
Conditions for πFt ≥ πSt : Here the payoﬀs involve two cases each. Con-
sider first the combination of Case A under free labor and Case 2 under
slavery, which we shall name Case I. Because Γ(Pt; γ) > [c/(1− α)]
1
α Pt
[see (14) and recall that γ > 0] this case prevails if At ≥ Γ(Pt; γ). Us-
ing the first lines in (11) and (17) we see that πFt ≥ πSt when αAαt P 1−αt ≥
Aαt [Pt/(1 + γ)]1−α − cPt. This can be written as At ≤ Ψ(Pt), where Ψ(Pt) is
defined in (18).
Consider next the combination of Case A under free labor and Case 1
under slavery, which we name Case II. This case prevails if [c/(1− α)]
1
α Pt <
At < Γ(Pt; γ). Using the first line in (11) and the second line in (17) we see
that πFt ≥ πSt when αAαt P 1−αt ≥ α {(1− α)/[(1 + γ)c]}
1−α
α At, or
At <
·
c(1 + γ)
1− α
¸ 1
α
Pt = (1 + γ)Γ(Pt; γ), (A5)
which always holds in Case II, since At < Γ(Pt; γ).
Consider finally the combination of Case B under free labor and Case 1
under slavery, which we nameCase III. This amounts toAt ≤ [c/(1− α)]
1
α Pt.
Using the lower rows of (11) and (17) we see that πFt ≥ πSt can be writ-
ten α [(1− α)/c]
1−α
α At ≥ α {(1− α)/[(1 + γ)c]}
1−α
α At. This amounts to
(1 + γ) 1−αα > 1, which always holds.
To sum up, in Cases II and III πFt ≥ πSt always holds; in Case I, πFt ≥ πSt
holds unless At > Ψ(Pt). Note that At > Ψ(Pt) can only hold in Case I, since
Ψ(Pt) > Γ(Pt; γ). Considering all Cases I—III together we thus conclude:
πFt ≥ πSt ⇐⇒ At ≤ Ψ(Pt). (A6)
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Conditions for πSt ≥ max
©
πFt ,πEt
ª
: This holds when both πSt ≥ πFt
and πSt ≥ πEt . Reversing (A6), πSt ≥ πFt is equivalent to that At ≥ Ψ(Pt).
The condition for πSt ≥ πEt is given in (A2). As long as πSt ≥ πFt and thus
At ≥ Ψ(Pt), it must hold that At > Γ(Pt; γ), because Ψ(Pt) > Γ(Pt; γ). It is
then straightforward to use (A2) to see that πSt ≥ max
©
πEt ,πFt
ª
when At is
greater than both Ψ(Pt) and Ω(Pt), and Pt is strictly greater than (1+γ)1−α,
i.e.,
Pt > (1 + γ)1−α and At ≥ max {Ψ(Pt),Ω(Pt)} , (A7)
which is equivalent to (At, Pt) being in SS, defined in (21). This proves part
(a).
Conditions for πFt ≥ max
©
πEt , πSt
ª
: This holds when both πFt ≥ πEt
and πFt ≥ πSt . As seen from (A6), πFt ≥ πSt requires that At ≤ Ψ(Pt). The
condition for πFt ≥ πEt is given in (A4): both Pt ≥ 1/α and At ≥ Φ(Pt) must
hold. Thus, πFt ≥ max
©
πEt , πSt
ª
holds when
Φ(Pt) ≤ At ≤ Ψ(Pt) and Pt ≥
1
α , (A8)
which is equivalent to (At, Pt) being in SF , defined in (21). This proves part
(b).
Conditions for πEt ≥ max
©
πFt ,πSt
ª
: This holds when both πFt ≥
max
©
πEt ,πSt
ª
and πSt ≥ max
©
πFt , πEt
ª
fail to hold, i.e., when (At, Pt) is
not in either SF or SS. This proves part (c). k
Proof of Proposition 2 : For part (a), note that wt ≥ c/(1−β) implies that
wt > c, so all Pt agents work and the wage rate is given by wt = (1−α)Aαt P−αt .
Thus, πFt = αAαt P 1−αt , and nlandownert = (β/q)αAαt P 1−αt . Then (25) gives
(27). To show part (b), consider first the case when At ≤ [c/(1− α)]1/α Pt
so that the labor force, Lt, adjusts so that the wage rate equals subsistence
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consumption: wt = c. Thus n
worker
t = 0, and (11) and Pt+1 = n
landowner
t =
(β/q)πFt give
Pt+1 =
βα
q
·
1− α
c
¸ 1−α
α
At <
βα
q
·
1− α
c
¸ 1−α
α
·
c
1− α
¸ 1
α
Pt < Pt, (A9)
where we have used Assumption 2, α < 1, and 1 − β < 1. Next, consider
the case when At > [c/(1− α)]1/α Pt, and thus wt > c. This gives nworkert =
(wt− c)/q > 0, and Pt+1 = (β/q)αAαt P 1−αt +(wt− c)Pt/q. Since all Pt agents
are working it must hold that wt = (1−α)Aαt P−αt . Using wt < c/(1−β) and
some algebra then shows that Pt+1 < {cβ/[q(1− α)(1− β)]}Pt. Assumption
2 demonstrates that cβ/[q(1− α)(1− β)] < 1 and thus Pt+1 < Pt. k
Proof of Proposition 3 : Part (a) follows from Pt+1 = Ptn
egal
t and (5).
Part (b) follows from noting that negalt = (πEt − c)/q < [c/(1 − β) − c]/q =
βc/[q(1−β)] < 1−α < 1, where we have used πEt < c/(1−β) and Assumption
2. Since Pt+1 = Ptn
egal
t , n
egal
t < 1 implies that Pt+1 < Pt. k
Proof of Proposition 4 : Part (a) follows from At > Γ(Pt; γ), (17), and
Pt+1 = n
slaveowner
t = (β/q)πSt . To prove part (b) first use At ≤ Γ(Pt; γ), (14),
and (17), which together imply that
πSt =
¡αAtc
1−α
¢½¡
1−α
c
¢ 1
α
³
1
1+γ
´ 1−α
α
¾
=
¡αAtc
1−α
¢n
Pt
Γ(Pt;γ)
o
≤ αcPt
1−α ,
(A10)
where (14) verifies that the factors in curly brackets are equal, and the in-
equality follows from At ≤ Γ(Pt; γ). The inequality in (A10) implies that
Pt+1 = n
slaveowner
t = (β/q)πSt ≤ {βαc/[q(1−α)]}Pt ≤ α(1− β)Pt < Pt, where
the second inequality follows from Assumption 2, and the third from α < 1
and β > 0. k
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Proof of Proposition 6 : Consider first part (a). First note from (29), (30),
and A > 0, that (31) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for LE/F(Pt) and
LA(Pt) to intersect. A free labor steady state exists if L
A(Pt) and L
E/F(Pt)
intersect in SF ; cf. Figure 3. From (18) and (29), it is seen that (32) is a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for LE/F(Pt) to pass through SF ; see (21).
Changing A shifts the intercept of LA(Pt), and moves the intersection along
LE/F(Pt). Thus, if, and only if, (31) and (32) hold, for some A they intersect
in SF . Let AF be the lowest A such that they do. Then a steady state exists
in SF for any A ≥ AF . Next consider part (b). Recall that (31) is a necessary
condition for LE/F(Pt) and L
A(Pt) to intersect at all. The intersection must
be in SE if A is suﬃciently small; see (21). k
Proof of Proposition 7 : Similar to the proof of Proposition 6, a steady
state with slavery is given by an intersection of LA(Pt) and L
S(Pt) in SS; cf.
Figures 3 and 4. From (18) and (30), if (34) holds, LS(Pt) must pass through
SS; see (21). If (33) holds, then LS(Pt) slopes steeper than LA(Pt), ensuring
that LA(Pt) and L
S(Pt) do intersect. Shifting A moves the intersection along
LS(Pt), ensuring that for some A suﬃciently large they intersect in SS. Let
A
S
be the lowest A such that they do. Then a steady state exists in SS for
any A ≥ AS. The “only if” part is seen from reversing either (33) or (34), or
both; this rules out an intersection of LA(Pt) and L
S(Pt) in SS for any A. k
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Figure 1: Population density and property rights to land and people at dif-
ferent stages of long-run development. Source: Nolan and Lenski (1999, pp.
107, 125, 144).
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Figure 2. Institutional regions.
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Figure 3. A transition through all three institutions.
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Figure 4. Phase diagram with both a slavery and a free labor steady state.
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Figure 5. Institutional regions with increasing guarding costs.
